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Abstract 
 
The introduction of carbon charges on the use of fossil fuels in China would have 
a progressive impact on income distribution. This outcome, which contrasts to the 
regressive distributional impact found in most studies of carbon charges in 
industrialized countries, is driven primarily by differences between urban and 
rural expenditure patterns. If carbon revenues were recycled on an equal per 
capita basis via a ‘sky trust,’ the progressive impact would be further enhanced: 
low-income (mainly rural) households would receive more in sky-trust dividends 
than they pay in carbon charges, and high- income (mainly urban) households 
would pay more than they receive in dividends. Thus a Chinese sky trust would 
contribute to both lower fossil fuel consumption and greater income equality. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper examines the scope for addressing two problems in the Chinese economy with 
one policy. The problems are rising fossil fuel consumption and rising income inequality. 
The policy is a ‘sky trust’: a system of carbon charges in which the revenues are recycled 
to the public on an equal per capita basis. 
 
The choice of China as a setting for this analysis is motivated by three considerations. 
First, China’s rising use of fossil fuels is widely seen as jeopardizing both the 
sustainability of the country’s rapid economic growth and the prospects for redressing 
global climate change. Second, China’s rising income inequality, particularly urban-rural 
inequality, is a source of concern from the standpoints of both human development and 
potential social unrest. Third, as a developing country, China’s pattern of fossil fuel use is 
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likely to differ from that in the industrialized countries where most prior studies of the 
distributional impacts of carbon charges have been undertaken. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of China’s role in 
the global carbon economy. Section 3 surveys the literature on the distributional effects 
of carbon charges. Section 4 describes how a sky trust would work. Section 5 discusses 
the data sources and methodology used in the study. Section 6 presents the results, and 
Section 7 offers concluding observations.  
 
 
2. China and the Global Carbon Economy 
 
China is the world’s second- largest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2), the most important 
‘greenhouse gas’ implicated in global climate change. In 2002, China’s CO2 releases 
from the consumption and flaring of fossil fuels amounted to 906 million metric tons of 
carbon (mtC), 13.5% of worldwide emissions; the United States, the world’s largest 
consumer of fossil fuels, emitted 1568 million mtC, or 23.4% of the total (see Figure 1a).  
 
In per capita terms, China’s carbon emissions are only about one-eighth of those in the 
United States (see Figure 1b). In recent years, however, the absolute volume of China’s 
emissions has risen substantially, propelled by the country’s rapid economic growth. 
Roughly 70% of the country’s total energy supply comes from coal. China’s fossil fuel 
consumption grew at an annual rate of 3.8% from 1980 to 2002, according to official 
figures. Given that the country’s GDP grew at a 9.1% rate in the same period, this implies 
a rather low income elasticity of fossil fuel consumption (0.4) compared to other low-
income economies (Zhang 2000, 745).1 Even so, extrapolation from current trends 
implies that China’s carbon emissions will double by the year 2025.  
 
A comprehensive picture of China’s role in the global carbon economy would include 
other sources of CO2 releases, notably from the burning of wood and other biomass 
resources, as well as the reabsorption of CO2 by terrestrial and marine plant life. Apart 
from the additional data needed for such an analysis, this would require grappling with 
the thorny question of how the carbon reabsorptive capacity of the biosphere – including 
that of the oceans, which accounts for about half the total – ought to be allocated across 
countries.2 In this paper we avoid these complications by focusing solely on CO2 
emissions from the burning of fossil fuels. 
 
As a developing country, China is not subject to the mandatory emission-reduction 
targets specified in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. No international agreement limiting the 
carbon emissions of developing countries is imminent. Even in the absence of such an 
agreement, however, it is possible that China will choose at some point to act unilaterally 
to curb its use of fossil fuels. Several considerations could bring this about. First, China is 
not well-endowed with fossil fuel resources (World Bank 1997, 49); as a result, the 
country is now importing coal from Australia, in addition to being the world’s fastest-
growing importer of oil.3 Second, China may be more vulnerable to climate change than 
are the industrialized countries, due to the much higher share of agriculture, an especially 
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climate-sensitive sector, in its GDP (Zhang 2000, 749).4 Third, the health and 
environmental benefits of reduced use of fossil fuels (or slower growth in their use) by 
virtue of lower emissions of pollutants with localized effects – sulfur dioxide, nitrogen 
oxides, and particulates – would reduce, or perhaps even offset, the net social cost of 
emission reductions.5 Fourth, China faces mounting international pressure on this issue, 
particularly from the United States government; the Bush administration cited the 
absence of emission reduction targets for China and other developing countries in 
rejecting the Kyoto agreement as ‘fatally flawed’ (Bush 2001). Finally, China already has 
introduced a system of pollution charges to curb sulfur dioxide emissions (Sterner 2003, 
321), a precedent that may lower the administrative and institutional barriers the 
introduction of carbon charges. 
 
To assess the prospects for measures to limit fossil fuel consumption in China, and the 
potential economic and social effects of such measures, it is important to assess the likely 
distributional impacts of such policies. Income inequality in China has grown rapidly in 
recent years, with the Gini coefficient rising from .382 in 1988 to .452 in 1995 (Khan and 
Riskin 2001, 41). Rural-urban disparities are a major component of this inequality, with 
the average income per capita in urban areas (5706 yuan or US$683 in 1995) being 2.5 
times higher than that in rural China (2307 yuan or US$276).6 Accordingly, 17% of the 
rural population was living in poverty in 1995, as compared with 4% of the urban 
population. 7  
 
To a substantial extent, carbon emissions are driven by household expenditure.8 Yet to 
the best of our knowledge, prior studies of China’s carbon economy have not 
disaggregated across households on the basis of income and the rural-urban divide. Our 
paper in an initial attempt to address this lacuna. 
 
 
3. Distributional Incidence of Carbon Charges  
 
One way to reduce carbon emissions is to establish a system of carbon charges that 
curtail demand for fossil fuels by raising their price.9  The distributional incidence of 
carbon charges is important in assessing both their welfare effects and the political 
economy of their introduction. Two questions arise: First, how will higher prices for 
fossil fuels (and for goods and services whose production uses fossil fuels) affect 
different households? Second, how will the revenues generated by carbon charges be 
used and the resulting benefits distributed? This section reviews the available evidence on 
the first question; section 4 considers the second. 
 
Several European countries have introduced carbon charges, starting with Finland in 
1990 and followed by Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Italy (Baranzini 
et al., 2000). A European Union-wide carbon tax was proposed, but not implemented, in 
the 1990s (Smulders and Vollebergh 2001). Studies in these and other industrialized 
countries generally have concluded that carbon charges are regressive – taking a bigger 
slice in percentage terms from low-income households than from high- income 
households – or in some cases distributionally neutral or mixed. For example, a 
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simulation analysis by Symons et al. (1994) found that a carbon tax in the United 
Kingdom would be ‘severely regressive.’ In Canada, according to Hamilton and Cameron 
(1994), a carbon tax would be ‘moderately regressive.’ Cornwell and Creedy (1996) 
likewise found that a carbon tax in Australia would be regressive. Symons et al. (2000) 
reported regressive effects in Germany, France, and Spain, a mixed effect in the UK, and 
a neutral effect in Italy. Klinge Jacobsen et al. (2003) and Wier et al. (2005) find that 
Denmark’s carbon taxes are regressive, and Brännlund and Nordström report that 
increases in carbon taxes in Sweden would be regressive. Summarizing the results of 
studies from various OECD countries, Cramton and Kerr (1999, p. 261) conclude: ‘The 
weak regressivity of carbon regulation appears to hold across countries and modeling 
techniques.’10 
  
In assessing distributional impacts, studies often have stratified households on the basis 
of expenditure rather than income, on the grounds that expenditure provides a better 
proxy for lifetime income and is less subject to transitory shocks. If distributional 
incidence instead is calculated on an income basis, carbon charges look even more 
regressive, because expenditure-to- income ratios generally decline as household incomes 
rise (for discussion, see Metcalf 1999). 
 
The methodologies used in these studies have ranged from relatively simple 
computations based on the shares of energy products in household expenditure to 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. Most studies assume that carbon charges 
are fully shifted forward to consumers, altering the relative prices of goods and services 
in proportion to their carbon content. The regressive incidence of carbon charges thus 
reflects the fact that the expenditure patterns of low-income households tend to be more 
carbon-intensive than those of high- income households.11  
 
Whether these findings can be generalized to the developing countries of Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America is an open question. Patterns of household expenditure and energy use 
in developing countries are likely to differ from those in industrialized countries. For 
example, ownership and use of automobiles is less prevalent in developing countries, and 
more concentrated in high- income households. Less fuel is used for home heating in 
tropical and subtropical climates. And biofuels, such as wood and crop residues, are 
widely used for cooking, particularly in poor rural households.12 Given these differences, 
it is not evident that higher prices for fossil fuels would have a regressive impact in 
developing countries. It has been speculated that ‘the net effect of adding a carbon tax in 
developing countries may well be proportional to income, or even progressive’ (OECD 
1995, p. 25). 
 
A handful of empirical studies have investigated the distributional impact of carbon 
charges in developing countries, with mixed results. Shah and Larsen (1992) found that 
with full forward shifting to consumers, a carbon tax in Pakistan would be regressive (but 
that with only partial shifting it could be progressive). In a study of Iran, Jensen and Tarr 
(2002) similarly report that the withdrawal of subsidies on domestic energy products 
would have a regressive effect, although if this were accompanied by lump-sum 
redistribution of the savings the net effect would be progressive. On the other hand, in 
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studies of Ghana and Madagascar, respectively, Younger (1996) and Younger et al. 
(1999) conclude that taxes on petroleum products, other than kerosene, are progressive.13 
 
 
4. The ‘Sky Trust’ Option for Lump-sum Revenue Recycling 
 
The net distributional effect of a carbon-charge system depends not only on the impacts 
of price changes on households, but also on the uses of the revenues generated by the 
charges. If carbon-charge revenues flow to government as a ‘carbon tax,’ and are used to 
increase public expenditure and/or reduce other taxes, the net effect depends on the 
incidence of these policies. In this paper we consider an alternative revenue-recycling 
option: lump-sum redistribution to all households on an equal per capita basis. Such a 
system has been dubbed a ‘sky trust’ (Barnes 2001).14   
  
A sky trust would be an autonomous institution established by government action but 
operating outside the government budget, akin to social security trust funds. It would 
receive the revenues from carbon charges, and redistribute them to households after a 
small deduction for administrative costs. Revenues would be most easily, and 
inexpensively, collected ‘upstream’: at the coal mines, oil refineries, natural gas facilities, 
and ports where fossil fuels first enter the economy. 15 
 
The sky trust option has three attractive features. First, it asserts the principle of common 
ownership of na ture’s wealth: rights to benefit from the carbon-absorptive capacities of 
the biosphere are allocated equally to all. Second, it yields a progressive redistribution of 
income, the scale of which depends on the level of the carbon charges and on how the 
carbon intensity of household expenditure varies with income. Third, unlike tax shifting 
and increased public expenditure, the distributional outcome of the sky trust does not 
depend on the willingness and ability of government to do ‘the right thing’ – however 
defined – with present and future carbon revenues; in other words, once it is established, 
the sky trust is insulated from the vagaries of fiscal politics.16  
 
Several studies have analyzed the distributional impact of a hypothetical sky trust in the 
United States. Recognizing that ‘the amount of wealth that a U.S. carbon trading policy 
would redistribute could reach into the tens or hundreds of billions of dollars,’ the U.S. 
Congressional Budget Office (2000) compared two methods of allocating carbon 
emission allowances – selling them (i.e., carbon charges), or giving them away to fossil 
fuel producers and importers free of charge – and two methods of revenue recycling: 
reducing corporate taxes, or rebating an identical lump-sum to each household.17 The 
only scenario that was found to have a progressive distributional effect was the 
combination of allowance sales with lump-sum redistribution: in this case, the regressive 
effect of price increases (arising from an inverse relation between income and the share 
of income spent on carbon- intensive goods) was outweighed by the progressive effect of 
equal payments. With a carbon charge of $100/ton, the CBO estimated that after-tax 
incomes in the lowest quintile of the income distribution would rise by 1.8%, while those 
of the top quintile would decrease by 0.9%. In an extension of the CBO analysis, Dinan 
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and Rogers (2002), reported even stronger redistributive impacts: a 3.5% rise in incomes 
for the lowest quintile, coupled with a 1.6% decline for the top quintile.18  
 
Both of these studies assumed that carbon charges are distortionary, creating ‘deadweight 
losses’ by reducing fossil fuel consumption (and also, in the Dinan and Rogers study, by 
lowering real returns to labor and capital and thereby reducing factor supplies). For 
example, when consumers curtail fuel consumption in response to higher prices, they 
suffer welfare losses in the form of ‘the discomfort associated with keeping their house 
cooler in the winter or the loss in satisfaction that would result from canceling a vacation 
because of high gasoline prices’ (U.S. Congressional Budget Office 2003, p. 3). By 
placing a monetary value on the foregone consumer surplus and distributing these losses 
across households, the studies diminish the sky trust’s positive effect on incomes of low-
income households, and augment its negative effect on those of high- income households. 
It can be argued, however, that the true distortion is the subsidy currently implicit in the 
failure to charge for use of the limited carbon absorptive capacities of the biosphere. If 
so, appropriately calibrated carbon charges would remove a distortion rather than creating 
one. 
 
Neither study attempts to estimate the welfare gains that would result from reductions in 
carbon emissions, via the mitigation of climate change and associated reductions in 
emissions of other pollutants. Yet these gains are the prime rationale for introducing 
carbon charges. A comprehensive analysis of the distributional impacts of carbon charges 
would allocate them across households, too. In the absence of this accounting, the 
incorporation of ‘deadweight losses’ from carbon charges gives a misleading picture of 
net welfare effects: in effect, this procedure counts the cost of correcting for the welfare 
losses from excessive carbon emissions, without counting the benefits. In this paper, we 
adopt the simpler – and, in our view, more appropriate – procedure of estimating the 
distributional impacts of the carbon charges and revenue recycling alone, without 
attempting to incorporate other welfare effects. 
 
Barnes and Breslow (2003) follow this procedure in a third analysis of the distributional 
impact of a United States sky trust, using a higher carbon price of $191/ton. They find 
that the bottom decile would receive a net benefit equal to 5.1% of income, while the top 
decile would bear a net loss of 0.9%, and that seven deciles would see net gains. That is, 
the majority of the population would receive more in rebates than they paid as a result of 
higher fuel prices.19 Insofar as public policy follows the principle of majority rule, this 
result suggests that the establishment of a sky trust would be politically feasible. 
 
While these studies find that a sky trust generally would benefit low-income households, 
they acknowledge that some, whose livelihoods are tied to production or use of fossil 
fuels – coal miners and truck drivers, for example – could bear net losses. One way to 
compensate for these is to allocate some percentage of the sky trust’s revenues to 
transitional adjustment assistance that assists displaced workers in moving into new jobs. 
For example, Barnes (2001) proposes a transition fund that initially would recycle 25% of 
the sky trust revenue and be phased out over a ten-year period. We do not include 
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transitional adjustment assistance in our analysis of the distributional effects of a Chinese 
sky trust, but such a component could be readily added. 
 
 
5. Data Sources and Methodology 
 
In order to examine the distributional implications of a carbon tax in mainland China this 
study draws on a nationally representative household income and expenditure survey 
conducted for the year 1995. The survey was designed and overseen by scholars at the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of Economics (CASS), and provides the 
only publicly available, nationally representative household data from mainland China in 
the reform era.20  Households in the CASS sample are drawn from the Chinese State 
Statistical Bureau’s (SSB) annual income and expenditure survey, and SSB enumerators 
were contracted to administer the CASS questionnaires.  
 
Because the CASS survey is drawn from the SSB’s parent sample, it inherits many of its 
features. For example urban and rural households are sampled separately, and must be 
appropriately weighted when combined to produce estimates representative of the 
population. 21  This CASS survey also inherits many of the problems associated with the 
SSB’s parent sample, discussed thoroughly in Chen and Ravallion (1996). Perhaps the 
most striking of these is the fact that the SSB sample frame is constructed on the basis of 
households’ residence of record. As such, so-called floating migrants are not enumerated 
in either their village of origin or their current place of residence. Finally, it bears note 
that the CASS surveys also follow the SSB’s method for sample selection, using a 
procedure known as the ‘equidistant selection method’ (duichen dengju chouyang 
fangshi), which roughly corresponds to systematic sampling. 22   
 
The survey instrument used for 1995 was developed by CASS, in collaboration with an 
international team of scholars. It was based on a 1988 household income and expenditure 
survey conducted by CASS (see Griffin and Zhao 1993), with some minor changes. 
Surveys were administered in the selected counties by the SSB survey teams between 
March and June 1996 for the reference year 1995. Data for the CASS survey were 
compiled largely from the daily diaries and cash and goods transaction books maintained 
for the SSB’s annual household income and expenditure survey. 23  However, the CASS 
survey made substantial improvements over the survey instrument currently in use by the 
SSB, particularly with regard to the measurement of household income.24  
 
Before reviewing the major assumptions involved in estimating household carbon usage, 
Table 1 provides an overview of the expenditure patterns for households by expenditure 
decile (each of which represents 10% of the population).25  Considering the all-China 
data presented in Panel A, several features stand out. First, the top two expenditure 
deciles account for more than half of all household expenditures. Second, in the lowest 
decile, food expenditures comprise more than three-quarters of total spending. This share 
falls to less than 40% for the highest decile. A corollary is that the share of non-food 
items rises as we move up the expenditure distribution. Finally, we see that carbon-
intensive categories of household spending – items such as fuel, electricity, and 
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transportation – account for a small share of average household expenditures, but that this 
share rises with household expenditure. Separate results for rural and urban China 
(presented in panels B and C, respectively) are broadly similar, the main difference being 
that the share of spending on fuels and electricity falls as we move up the expenditure 
distribution; the opposite finding at the all-China level is driven by rural-urban 
differences. 
 
Measuring Household Carbon Usage 
 
In this study we measure carbon usage at the household level in two steps. First, we 
separate household spending into six categories: (i) food, including the value of self-
produced agricultural products; (ii) industrial goods, including clothing, daily use 
consumption goods, and durable goods; (iii) housing, specifically new construction and 
repair costs;26 (iv) household fuels and electricity; (v) transportation and communication; 
and (vi) other expenditures, including education, medical expenditures, and other 
miscellaneous spending.  
 
Second, we apply a carbon loading factor to each of these six expenditure categories, in 
order to estimate the carbon usage embodied in these different types of household 
consumption. This provides us with a metric to evaluate the distributional implications of 
a carbon charge.  
 
We derive loading factors by matching the six expenditure categories from our survey 
data to corresponding categories in the Chinese system of national accounts. Table 2 
depicts the basic steps. In the first column we report the total energy consumption of each 
major economic sector, measured in millions of tons of Standard Coal Equivalent 
(SCE).27  In the second column we report the total value of Gross Domestic Product in 
each of the same major economic sectors, in billions of yuan.28 The third column presents 
the tons of SCE per 10,000 yuan of final demand (i.e. the quotient of columns one and 
two), while the last column presents our loading factors in terms of tons of carbon per 
10,000 yuan of final demand.29 We convert tons of SCE to tons of carbon using as a 
conversion factor the total tons of carbon emitted in China in 1995 divided by the total 
tons of SCE utilized in that year.30   
 
We then estimate the per capita carbon consumption using the following formula: 
 
     C = 0.03*EXPF + 0.24*EXPI + 0.02*EXPH + 1.20*EXPE + 0.11*EXPT  + 0.03*EXPO 
 
where C = total carbon consumption (in kilograms); EXP = expenditure (in yuan); and 
subscripts F, I, H, E, T, and O refer to food, industrial goods, housing, fuels and 
electricity, transportation and communication, and other expenditures, respectively. 
 
The Carbon Charge 
 
To assess the distributional implications of a carbon charge and sky trust revenue-
recycling scheme in China, we assume a charge of 300 yuan per metric ton of carbon.  
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A charge of this magnitude is squarely within the range of hypothetical carbon charges 
used in prior research on China. For example, Zhang (1998) evaluates the degree to 
which a carbon charge would reduce CO2 emissions in China under two scenarios: a 
charge of 205 yuan/tC, and another set at 400 yuan/tC. Zhang estimates that the first 
scenario would lead to a 20% reduction in projected carbon emissions in 20 years 
(between 1990 and 2010), while under the second scenario emissions would fall by 30%. 
In a study of the impact of a carbon charge on emissions in Shanghai, Gielen and Chen 
(2001) use a charge of 100 yuan/tCO2 (equivalent to 367 yuan/tC); they estimate that this 
would result in an 11% reduction in carbon emissions between 2000 and 2010, along 
with a substantial shift in types of abatement technology deployed.  
 
The charge of 300 yuan/tC is also comparable with existing carbon charges in other 
countries. For example, five European countries had coal taxes in place in 1999, ranging 
from $14/tCO2 in Finland to $67/tCO2 in Demark (Baranzini, Goldemberg, and Speck, 
2000). This range is equivalent to 103 yuan/tC to 491 yuan/tC.31 
 
For simplicity, we calculate the distributional impact of carbon charges on the basis of 
the 1995 consumption patterns, without estimating changes in demand in response to 
higher fossil fue l prices.32 Equivalently, we could use a  higher carbon charge coupled 
with commensurately lower demand. For example, a 400 yuan/tC charge that reduces 
carbon demand to 75% of the 1995 level would yield the same results. 
 
In calculating the distributional impact of recycling carbon revenues through a sky trust, 
we deduct 1% from total revenues to cover administrative costs. As noted in section 4, 
administrative costs would be minimized by revenue collection at mine mouths, 
refineries, and ports where fossil fuels enter the economy. We regard this as a 
conservative assumption (that is, a high-end estimate of the administrative costs); by way 
of comparison, administrative costs for petroleum taxes and excise duties typically range 
from 0.12 to 0.25% of revenue (Smulders and Vollebergh, 2001, p. 116). 
 
 
6. Results 
 
Our main results are presented in Tables 3 and 4.  Table 3 shows the distributional 
incidence of a carbon charge on its own, without taking into account the use of the 
proceeds. Table 4 shows the effect of a sky trust, with the carbon revenue recycled to the 
Chinese people on an equal per capita basis.  The incidence of the charge on each 
household is calculated by multiplying per capita carbon consumption by 300 yuan per 
ton of carbon.  The tax/expenditure column is the average of the tax incidence to 
expenditure ratios for each person in the decile.33 
 
Distributional Effects of Carbon Charges 
 
Table 3 shows that even without an egalitarian redistribution of the revenues, the effect of 
the carbon charge would be progressive.  The lowest decile pays 2.1% of their total 
 10 
expenditures into the charge, and the highest decile pays 3.2%.  This reflects the fact that 
the mix of products that relatively rich people buy is, on average, more carbon intensive 
than what relatively poor people buy.  This contrasts with results from studies in other 
countries, reviewed in section 3, which generally have found a carbon charge to be either 
regressive or neutral.  Our results call into question the generality of this conclusion.  
 
A closer look at what lies behind this progressive incidence is useful.  The breakdown 
into urban and rural areas shows that the incidence of the charge in urban areas is higher 
than in rural areas.  As we saw in Table 1, urban areas have more carbon- intensive 
expenditure patterns, spending significantly more than rural households on household 
energy and industrial goods, the two most carbon-intensive sectors in China.  The rural 
population, on the other hand, devotes a larger share of its expenditure to food, which is 
much less carbon- intensive.  The result is that urban areas would pay an average of 3.3% 
of their expenditure into the sky trust, while rural areas would only pay 2.0%.  Since the 
average income in urban areas is considerably higher than in rural areas, this makes the 
overall incidence of the charge progressive.   
 
A similar pattern may exist in other developing countries – particularly where rural areas 
are relatively poor, consume few industrial products and obtain much of their direct 
energy use from firewood and other biomass that would not be subject to carbon charges.  
In contrast to the pattern often reported for industrial countries, carbon charges may turn 
out to be progressive in many developing countries. 
 
It is the difference between China’s rural and urban areas that makes the overall effects of 
the carbon charge progressive. Within each region, the size of the charge is roughly 
proportional to expenditures.  Every decile in the urban areas pays between 3.2% and 
3.5% of their expenditures into the charge, while every decile in rural areas pays between 
1.8% and 2.1%.  Behind these results are offsetting trends in the different expenditure 
categories: the most energy-intensive category, fuels and electricity, accounts for a larger 
share of expenditures for the poorer households in each region, but the other two energy-
intensive categories, transportation and industrial goods, form a larger part of the 
expenditures of the richer households.   
 
Distributional Effects of a Chinese Sky Trust 
 
Table 4 shows the incidence of a sky trust scheme, in which the money from the carbon 
charge is redistributed to households on an equal per capita basis.  The size of the 
dividend payout, which comes to 69 yuan per person, is found simply by dividing the 
total revenue by the number of people in China (after deducting 1% for administrative 
costs).  The net benefit of the sky trust is the payout minus the per capita incidence of the 
charge shown in Table 3.  The last three columns of Table 4 show the charge, dividend, 
and net benefit as a percentage of household expenditures. 
 
Clearly, the combined effect of the carbon charge and dividend redistribution is strongly 
progressive.  Nationwide, the bottom seven expenditure deciles would benefit from the 
sky trust, while the top three deciles would pay more into the fund than they would get 
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back in dividends.  As noted in section 4, even in the US, where a carbon charge alone 
would be regressive, the equal per capita payout via a sky trust would yield a progressive 
net effect.  This occurs as long as total carbon use by rich households is higher than 
carbon use by poor households, even if the carbon intensity of consumption is higher for 
poor people.  In China, where the carbon intensity of consumption is lower for poor 
people, the progressive effect is that much stronger.  
 
The majority of China’s population (about 70%) would be net beneficiaries from the sky 
trust in purely financial terms, not counting any benefits associated with improvements in 
environmental quality. Moreover, as a percentage of household expenditure, the net 
benefits to the lower deciles are greater than the net losses to the higher deciles.34 
 
The magnitude of redistribution depends on the size of the carbon charge.  At 300 yuan 
per ton of carbon, the households in China’s poorest decile would see their incomes rise 
by the equivalent of 10.3% of total expenditure.  A higher charge would redistribute more 
from top to lower deciles, and a smaller charge would redistribute less, but there would 
be no change in which deciles would gain and lose, nor in the relative sizes of their 
benefits and losses.   
 
The breakdown between rural and urban households again shows striking differences.  In 
urban China the top nine deciles would incur net losses of income and only the bottom 
decile would benefit, while in rural China the bottom nine deciles would benefit and the 
top decile would break even.  This reflects the fact that rural areas have both lower total 
expenditures and a less carbon-intensive pattern of expenditure than urban areas. 
 
Our results do not change substantially when households are ranked by per capita income 
rather than per capita expenditure.  Appendix II shows the net effect of the sky trust on 
households ranked by per capita income.  The most noteworthy difference is that the 
charge, on its own, is no longer clearly progressive when taken as a percentage of 
income.  Urban households still pay a higher portion of their income than rural 
households, but within each region the incidence is regressive, leading to mixed results 
when the two regions are combined.  This is consistent with observations from other 
studies that find that consumption-based taxes look relatively more regressive when 
income is used as the denominator and basis of stratification. 35  However, it is worth 
noting that even when households are ranked by income, the charge is progressive when 
measured as a percentage of expenditures.36   
 
While the choice between the income and expenditure lenses affects how progressive a 
carbon charge appears on its own, there is not much difference in the results once the sky 
trust dividend payments are entered into the picture.  Regardless of whether expenditure 
or income is used as the basis for comparisons, the net effect of a Chinese sky trust is 
strongly progressive, with the bottom seven deciles nationwide registering gains and the 
top three registering losses.   
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Effects of a Sky Trust on Poverty 
 
A Chinese sky trust would substantially reduce poverty, especially in rural China.  Table 
5 shows the effect it would have on poverty rates, using a poverty line of 810 yuan for 
rural China and 1604 yuan for urban China.37  Before implementing a sky trust, 14.7% of 
our sample had expenditures below this poverty line: 19.1% in rural areas and 3.8% in 
urban areas.  The net effect of a sky trust, with the carbon charge set at 300 yuan/tC, is a 
21% reduction in the headcount poverty rate, from 14.7% to 11.6%.  A total of 36.4 
million rural people and 292,000 urban people would be lifted out of poverty as a result. 
 
Table 5 also reports two additional poverty measures, the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke ‘P1’ 
and ‘P2’ measures. The first, also known as the ‘poverty gap,’ measures not only the 
number of people below the poverty line but also the depth of their poverty, that is, how 
far the poor are below the poverty line.  Implementing a sky trust of the magnitude 
examined here would reduce the poverty gap nationwide by 28%.  The final poverty 
measure, known as the ‘squared poverty gap,’ puts greater weight on the gaps of the 
poorest.  By this measure, the impact of the sky trust is even stronger, reducing poverty 
by 34%, with the strongest impact in rural China.  
 
 
7. Conclusions  
 
In China, the introduction of carbon charges on fossil fuels would have a progressive 
distributional effect: high- income households would pay a larger percentage of their 
income than low-income households. This is in contrast to the regressive impact found in 
most studies of industrialized countries. Our results suggest that findings on the incidence 
of carbon charges in industrialized countries cannot be readily generalized to developing 
countries, due to differences in patterns of expenditure on personal transportation, home 
heating, industrial goods, and the use of bio-fuels.  
 
If the revenues from carbon charges were recycled to the populace on an equal per capita 
basis through a sky trust, the progressive impact would be further enhanced. With a 
charge set at 300 yuan per ton of carbon, the poorest decile would receive a net income 
gain equivalent to 10.3% of total expenditure, while the richest decile would see a 2.3% 
decline.  Countrywide, roughly 70% of China’s population would emerge as net 
‘winners’ from the sky trust, with more money in their pockets after the policy than 
before.  Poverty would be reduced by more than 20% by the simple headcount measure, 
and even more substantially by measures that take into account the depth of poverty as 
well as its breadth. 
 
China’s wide and growing urban-rural disparities play a key role in these results. While 
90% of rural people would be net winners, 90% of urban households would be net losers. 
Given the size of China’s urban-rural income gap, the negative net impact on most urban 
households may be regarded as acceptable from an equity standpoint.  Politically, 
however, this may prove to be a liability.  One strategy to address this concern is to 
modify the policy so as to ease or reverse adverse impacts on the lower deciles in urban 
 13 
areas. In a similar fashion, Holland’s tax on energy use exempts certain small consumers 
(Zhang and Baranzini 2004, p. 511).  
 
We have made no attempt to measure the welfare gains that would accrue to the Chinese 
people from the environmental benefits of reduced use of fossil fuels, including lower 
greenhouse gas emissions and lower emissions of other pollutants such as sulfur dioxide. 
These could be substantial, however, and they would add to the attractions of a Chinese 
sky trust. 
 
The policy relevance of the results presented here extends beyond China.  In other 
developing countries, too, carbon consumption patterns may more closely resemble those 
of China than those of the industrialized countries. In addition, there may be scope for the 
international community to encourage adoption of carbon-charge systems in China and 
elsewhere.  Under the Clean Development Mechanism established by the Kyoto protocol, 
for example, industrialized-country signatories could reimburse developing countries for 
implementing measures to cut carbon emissions, using these reductions to fulfill part of 
their Kyoto obligations.  This would provide additional resources that could be used to 
offset income losses (for example, to China’s urban lower and middle deciles), invest in 
renewable energy, and provide transitional adjustment assistance to coal-mining regions 
(Gielen and Changhong, 2001). Aid donors also could use ‘green conditionality’ to 
encourage developing country governments to introduce sky trust policies (D’Arista and 
Boyce, 2002).  Funds from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) could be used to 
underwrite the initial costs of establishing sky trusts.38 
 
As noted in Section 2, there are several reasons why Chinese policy makers may decide 
to take institute measures to reduce the country’s use of fossil fuels: shortfalls in domestic 
supplies; the country’s vulnerability to climate change; the health and environmental 
benefits of reduced pollution; the weight of international opinion; and the fact that the 
country already is developing the capacity to administer pollution charges.  This paper 
suggests that an appropriately designed policy can provide an additional reason to act: 
steps to reduce fossil fuel consumption can, at the same time, help to counteract widening 
economic disparities between rich and poor, and between urban and rural areas.   
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Endnotes
 
1 Growth in carbon dioxide emissions from consumption and flaring of fossil fuels calculated from data 
reported by the US Energy Information Administration (2004); GDP growth calculated from data reported 
by the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (based on constant 1990 yuan). The official figures 
may understate the rise in China’s use of fossil fuels, since some local governments apparently responded 
to central directives to shut down small low-grade coal mines and heavily polluting power plants simply by 
ceasing to report their operations to the central government (Bradsher 2003; see also Sinton 2001). 
 
2 Oceanic sinks and terrestrial sinks each absorb roughly 1900 million mtC/year; but land-use changes 
(especially deforestation) release roughly 1700 mtC/year; in net terms, oceanic sinks therefore account for 
close to 90% of annual carbon sequestration (Sarmiento and Gruber 2002). Agarwal and Narain (1991) 
argue that the Earth’s reabsorptive capacities should be allocated on an equal per capita basis. Using this 
formula, the contributions of populous nations like China and India to the world’s net carbon emissions is 
reduced relative to that of the United States and other industrialized economies.  
 
3 See Bradsher (2003). In an effort to limit China’s growing dependence on imported oil, in 2004 the 
government introduced new fuel-economy standards for automobiles that are more stringent than those in 
the United States (Bradsher, 2004). 
 
4 A study of regional differences in global warming damages found that damages in China would be 
equivalent to 6.1% of GNP, versus a world average of 1.5% (Fankhauser and Pearce 1994, p. 76, cited by 
OECD 1995, p. 34). 
 
5 In the case of Pakistan, for example, Shah and Larsen (1992) estimated that the benefits of reductions in 
local environmental externalities would more than offset the output losses from a carbon tax. The World 
Bank (1997, p. 54) estimates that inclusion of the health costs of coal use in Beijing would double its price. 
 
6 Khan and Riskin (2001, pp. 17 and 20). In a subsequent paper, Khan (2003) reports that in 2002 the 
urban-rural average income gap had widened to a 3:1 ratio. The national-level Gini coefficient remained 
unchanged, however, as widening urban-rural inequality was offset by greater equality within both sectors. 
 
7 Khan and Riskin (2001, pp. 66 and 71). The authors estimate headcount poverty for three different 
poverty lines in both rural and urban China. We report poverty rates for what they term the ‘Unadjusted 
Intermediate Poverty Threshold.’ For further discussion of rural-urban disparities, see Knight, Shi, and 
Song (1994). 
 
8 In 1995, the year to which the data reported in this paper pertain, total household consumption in China 
(estimated from the survey data presented below) amounted to 3,301.4 billion  yuan, equivalent to 57.6% of 
GNP as reported in the national income accounts (Khan and Riskin 2000, p. 25). While carbon emissions 
per yuan may differ somewhat between the household and non-household sectors, this gives a rough 
approximation of the household sector’s importance in the carbon economy. 
 
9 We call these ‘charges’ rather than ‘taxes,’ because their effect is to reduce or eliminate a de facto 
subsidy: free use of the limited carbon absorptive capacity of the biosphere. 
 
10 A recent study of Italy’s carbon tax (Tiezzi 2005) finds that it has a progressive incidence, however, by 
virtue of the fact that it hits transport fuels harder than domestic fuel use and that higher-income households 
reduced their consumption less in response to higher prices. 
 
11 If it is assumed that carbon charges are not fully passed on to consumers, but instead are partly absorbed 
by producers via reduced profit margins, the result is less regressive since capital ownership is concentrated 
in upper-income households (see Dinan and Rogers 2002; Parry 2004). For further discussion of 
methodologies for assessing the distributional incidence of carbon taxes, see Speck (1999). 
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12 In the case of China, for example, Wang and Feng (1999, p. 97) report that biomass accounts for 60-90% 
of rural household energy consumption. 
 
13 Addison and Osei (2001) question the conclusion that petroleum taxes are progressive in Ghana, 
however, arguing that adverse spillover effects via higher transport costs adversely affect the rural poor. 
 
14 The sky trust is an extension of the ‘feebate’ concept, whereby fees are paid according to the extent of 
individual resource use, and the proceeds rebated equally to all use-rights holders. This idea that has been 
applied to a variety of environmental problems; see, for example, Puig-Ventosa (2004). For an early 
application to gasoline taxes, see Shepard (1976). 
 
15 In the United States, this would translate into roughly 2000 collection points (Kopp et al. 1999; U.S. 
Congressional Budget Office 2001). Smulders and Vollebergh (2001, p. 116) report that the administrative 
costs of petroleum taxes and excise duties range from 0.12 to 0.25% of revenue, lower than most other 
taxes; see also Fisher et al. (1998). As the CBO (2001, p. 19) notes, administrative costs would increase if 
charges were levied not only on fossil fuels, but also on imports of carbon-intensive products (such as 
aluminum) so as to avoid placing domestic producers at a disadvantage in the absence of similar carbon 
policies in the exporting countries. 
 
16 In theory, one can design alternative uses of carbon-charge revenues that are superior to lump -sum 
redistribution on efficiency or distributional grounds, as Zhang and Baranzini (2004, pp. 511-2) discuss. In 
practice, these alternatives arguably would be more open to political manipulation than would a sky trust. 
Moreover, they would not share the first advantage identified here: affirmation of the principle of equal 
rights to nature’s common wealth. 
 
17 The give-away allocation option, sometimes referred to as ‘grandfathering,’ was the main method 
adopted in the U.S. when sulfur dioxide emissions permits were introduced in the 1990s. Insofar as permit 
rents are taxed, this method does generate some government revenue. Parry (2004) analyzes the impact of 
grandfathered carbon emissions permits in the U.S. with rents taxed at the rate of 35%; even when coupled 
with lump -sum redistribution of the proceeds, he finds that the distributional impact is regressive due to the 
highly skewed distribution of profit income. 
  
18 The stronger distributional effects in the Dinan and Rogers study arise mainly from (i) incorporation of 
an estimated ‘deadweight loss’ in factor markets due to the impact of higher carbon prices on real returns to 
capital and labor; and (ii) use of a lower value for average income in the lowest quintile. 
  
19 The incorporation of deadweight losses (without the attendant welfare gains) reduces the percentages of 
households who receive net benefits. Thus the CBO (2000) and Dinan & Rogers (2002) estimated that the 
bottom two quintiles would come out ahead, while the top three quintiles would be net losers. 
 
20 These data are available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research 
(ICPSR), holding number 3012. See Riskin, Zhao and Li (2000) for more details. A similar survey was also 
conducted for the year 1988 and is available through the ICPSR, holding number 9836. See Griffin and 
Zhao (1993) for more details. 
 
21 The 1995 urban sample contains 21,694 individual records, while the rural sample contains 34,739. In 
order to create a pooled sample that is representative of the country as a whole, the rural observations 
should be weighted by a factor of 24,741 (equal to the total rural population in 1995 divided by the number 
of individual observations in the rural sample). Likewise, observations in the urban sample must be 
weighted by a factor of 16,214. 
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22 See Eichen and Zhang (1993) for a complete discussion of the sample selection methods used in the 
1988 survey data (which were also followed in 1995). Briefly, the ‘equidistant selection method’ is applied 
to the selection of counties within the province, as well as villages within the county and households within 
the village. The unit to be selected is ranked, usually by per capita income, and selection is made at fixed 
intervals after a random start. Generally for counties with a population over 450,000, 80 households are 
selected, and for those under 450,000, that number is 60. Since 10 households are usually surveyed from 
each village, this implies that either 8 or 6 villages are surveyed depending on whether the county is above 
or below 450,000 in population. See Chen and Ravallion (1996) for more details. 
 
23 Participants in the SSB’s rural survey keep these logs for the entire reference year, the data from which 
are transferred to summary worksheets every two weeks, and then compiled by county level survey teams, 
where they are coded and checked for errors. Afterwards, they are sent to the provincial team, where they 
are cleaned and checked again, then they are sent to the national office in Beijing. 
 
24 For details, see Griffin and Zhao (1993) and Riskin, Zhao and Li (2001). 
 
25 In examining the expenditure distribution from the CASS survey, we eliminated those households with 
extraordinarily low reported expenditure. Specifically we deleted all households where reported total 
expenditure fell below one quarter of the median expenditure for the lowest decile of either the rural or 
urban sample, respectively.  
 
26 Our urban survey does not contain information on repair and construction costs, so these costs were 
estimated for each household.  From our rural survey we calculated that repair and construction costs were 
approximately 3.5 percent of the market purchase price of housing. We then applied this ratio to the market 
purchase price of urban housing to arrive at urban repair and construction costs.   
 
27 These data are drawn from the State Statistical Bureau’s China Statistical Yearbook (1996), Tables XXX. 
They exclude bio-energy, solar, and nuclear energy use. All fuels are converted into standard coal 
equivalent (SCE) with thermal equivalent of 7,000 kilocalorie per kilogram. The conversion is as follows 
(figures in brackets refer to thermal equivalent): 1 kg of coal (5,000 kcal)=.714kg of SCE; 1 kg of crude oil 
(10,000 kcal)=1.43 kg of SCE; 1 cubic meter of natural gas (9,310 kcal)=1.33kg of SCE. The conversion of 
hydropower into SCE is calculated on the basis of the consumption quota of standard coal for thermal 
power generation of the given year. 
 
28 The other expenditure categories from our household data do not match identically with national 
accounts categories. We used the following bridge between household expenditures and national accounts 
categories:  household transport and communication spending was matched to transportation, postal and 
telecommunication services; household spending on food was matched to the farming, forestry, animal 
husbandry, fishery and water conservancy national accounts category;  household industrial goods 
expenditures were matched to the national accounts category of industry; household spending on housing 
new construction and repair was matched with construction; and we used the non-material production 
sector for other household spending. For the expenditure category of household fuels and electricity, there 
is no corresponding national account entry capturing final demand. Instead we used an estimate of total 
national expenditure on household fuels and electricity derived from data provided in the China Statistical 
Yearbook .  In the urban areas we started with figures reported in the China Statistical Yearbook  on per 
capita spending on water, electricity, fuels and services. Using data from the 1988 CASS urban household 
survey (which were more detailed than the 1995 data) we estimated that 82.5 percent of this spending was 
on electricity and fuels alone. Similarly, in the rural areas we started with total per capita ‘residential’ 
expenditures reported in the China Statistical Yearbook , and using data from the 1988 CASS household 
survey we estimated that 23.4 percent of these expenditures were on fuel. 
 
29 The carbon loading factors reported in Table 2 represent only the ‘first-order’ carbon usage; carbon 
expended in the production or consumption of intermediate goods is not captured.  
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30 According to data from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration, China 
emitted 2,888.3 million metric tons of CO2 in 1995 (equivalent to 787.7 million metric tons of carbon). 
According to the State Statistical Bureau, China utilized 1,311.8 million metric tons of Standard Coal 
Equivalent (SCE) that same year. Using these figures, we convert tons SCE to tons of carbon using a factor 
of .601. 
 
31 Purchasing power parity-adjusted exchange rates are used for these calculations. 
 
32 Of course, one aim of carbon charges is precisely to shift expenditure toward less carbon-intensive goods 
and services. If the price elasticity of demand for carbon varies across deciles, this would affect the 
incidence of carbon charges. Because we do not have the data needed to incorporate this effect, we assume 
the price elasticity of demand to be constant across deciles. West and Williams (2002), using data from the 
United States, find that price responsiveness to gasoline taxes is inversely related to income; that is, in 
response to a higher price, lower-income households reduce consumption more than upper-income 
households, and hence ‘studies that do not consider demand responses will substantially overstate the 
regressivity of the gas tax’ (p. 6). A similar finding is reported for Italy by Tiezzi (2005). If this pattern 
were to apply to carbon charges in China, their progressivity would be even stronger than reported here.   
 
33 Note that this is slightly different from taking the average tax for the decile and dividing it by the average 
expenditure for the decile, so the third column will not be exactly equal to the 2nd column divided by the 
3rd column.  We chose to take the average of the ratios rather than the ratio of the averages in order to 
weigh the effect on each individual evenly when calculating the averages, rather than giving people with 
higher expenditures a higher weight.  The choice of method does not have a significant effect on the results, 
as can be seen in Appendix I. 
 
34 This reflects the simple fact that any lump -sum redistribution from rich to poor increases the incomes of 
the poor by a greater percentage than it decreases the incomes of the rich. 
 
35 See, for example, Poterba (1989), Bruce et al. (1996, pp. 419-421) and Shah and Larsen (1992, pp. 8-10). 
 
36 Although it is  more common to use only income or expenditure as the denominator and basis for 
stratification into deciles, rather than mixing the two, a reasonable case can be made for looking at tax 
incidence as a proportion of expenditure even when ranking households by income. For discussion, see 
Joint Committee on Taxation (1993). 
 
37 These poverty lines are adapted from the intermediate poverty thresholds used by Khan & Riskin (2000). 
In their work Khan and Riskin examine income poverty, whereas we are focused on exp enditure poverty. 
To shift from income to expenditure poverty thresholds, we calculated the average per capita expenditures 
of all individuals who were within 5 percent of the per capita income poverty threshold defined by Khan 
and Riskin. 
 
38 This would be consistent with the guidelines for use of GEF resources recommended by Johnson et al. 
(1996). 
 
 18 
References 
 
Addison, Tony and Robert Osei (2001) ‘Taxation and Fiscal Reform in Ghana,’ Helsinki: 
World Institute for Development Economics Research, Discussion Paper No. 2001/97. 
 
Agarwal, Anil and Sunita Narain (1991) Global Warming in an Unequal World. New 
Delhi: Centre for Science and the Environment. 
 
Baranzini, Andrea, José Goldemberg, and Stefan Speck (2000) ‘A Future for Carbon 
Taxes,’ Ecological Economics 32: 395-412. 
 
Barnes, Peter (2001) Who Owns the Sky? Our Common Assets and the Future of 
Capitalism. Washington, D.C.: Island Press. 
 
Barnes, Peter and Marc Breslow (2003) ‘The Sky Trust: The Battle for Atmospheric 
Scarcity Rent,’ in James K. Boyce and Barry G. Shelley, eds., Natural Assets: 
Democratizing Environmental Ownership. Washington, DC: Island Press, pp. 135-149. 
 
Bradsher, Keith (2003) ‘China Prospering but Polluting: Dirty fuels power economic 
growth,’ International Herald Tribune, 22 October, pp. 1, 6. 
 
Bradsher, Keith (2004) ‘China Tries to Reduce Thirst for Gas,’ International Herald 
Tribune, 23 September, p. 11. 
 
Brännlund, Runar and Jonas Nordström (2004) ‘Carbon Tax Simulations Using a 
Household Demand Model,’ European Economic Review 48: 211-233. 
 
Bruce, James P., Hoesung Lee and Erik F. Haites (eds.) (1996) Climate Change 1995: 
Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change. Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bush, George W. (2001) ‘President Bush Discusses Global Climate Change.’ Press 
Conference, 11 June. Available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/print/20010611-2.html. 
 
Chen, Shaohua and Martin Ravallion (1996), “Data in Trans ition: Assessing Rural Living 
Standards in Southern China,” China Economic Review. 7 (1):. 23-56. 
 
Cornwell, Antonia and John Creedy (1996) ‘Carbon Taxation, Prices and Inequality in 
Australia,’ Fiscal Studies 17(3): 21-38. 
 
Cramton, Peter and Suzi Kerr (1999) ‘The Distributional Effects of Carbon Regulation: 
Why Auctioned Carbon Permits are Attractive and Feasible,’ in Thomas Sterner, ed., The 
Market and the Environment. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, pp. 255-271. 
 
 19 
D’Arista, Jane and James K. Boyce (2002) ‘Where Credit is Due: Allocating Credit to 
Advance Environmental Goals,’ Challenge 45(3): 58-82. 
 
Dinan, Terry M. and Diane Lim Rogers (2002) ‘Distributional Effects of Carbon 
Allowance Trading: How Government Decisions Determine Winners and Losers,’ 
National Tax Journal 55: 199-222. 
 
Eichen, Marc and Zhang Ming (1993) ‘The 1988 Household Sample Survey – Data 
Description and Availability,’ in Griffin, Keith and Zhao Renwei (1993), The 
Distribution of Income in China. London: Macmillan. 
 
Fankhauser, S. and D.W. Pearce (1994) ‘The Social Costs of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions,’ in OECD, The Economics of Climate Change: Proceedings of an OECD/IEA 
Conference. Paris: OECD. 
 
Fisher, Carolyn, Suzi Kerr and Michael Toman (1998) ‘Using Emissions Trading to 
Regulate U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Design and Implementation Issues,’ National 
Tax Journal 51(3): 453-464. 
 
Gielen, Dolf and Chen Changhong (2001) ‘The CO2 Emission Reduction Benefits of 
Chinese Energy Policies and Environmental Policies: A Case Study for Shanghai, Period 
1995-2020,’ Ecological Economics 39: 257-270. 
 
Griffin, Keith and Zhao Renwei (1993), The Distribution of Income in China. London: 
Macmillan. 
 
Hamilton, Kirk and Grant Cameron (1994) ‘Simulating the Distributional Effects of a 
Canadian Carbon Tax,’ Canadian Public Policy 20(4): 385-399. 
 
Jensen, Jesper and David Tarr (2002) ‘Trade, Foreign Exchange, and Energy Policies in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran: Reform Agenda, Economic Implications, and Impact on the 
Poor,’ World Bank, January. 
 
Joint Committee on Taxation (1993) Methodology and Issues in Measuring Changes in 
the Distribution of Tax Burdens. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 
 
Johnson, Todd M., Junfeng Li, Zhongxiao Jiang, and Robert P. Taylor (1996) China: 
Issues and Options in Greenhouse Gas Emissions Control. Report of a Joint Study Team 
from the National Environmental Protection Agency of China, the State Planning 
Commission of China, United Nations Development Programme, and the World Bank. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
Khan, Azizur R. (2003) ‘Growth and Distribution of Household Income in China 
between 1995 and 2002,’ draft, University of California, Riverside. 
 
 20 
Khan, Azizur R., and Carl Riskin (2001) Inequality and Poverty in China in the Age of 
Globalization. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Klinge Jacobsen, H., K. Birr-Pedersen K., and M. Wier (2003) ‘Distributional 
Implications of Environmental Taxation in Denmark,’ Fiscal Studies 24( 4): 477-499. 
 
Kopp, Raymond, Richard Morgenstern, William Pizer, and Michael Toman (1999) ‘A 
Proposal for Credible Early Action in U.S. Climate Policy,’ Washington, DC: Resources 
for the Future. Available at http://www.weathervane.rff.org/features/feature060.html. 
 
Knight, John, Li Shi, and Lina Song (2005) ‘The Rural-Urban Divide and the Evolution 
of Political Economy in China,’ in James K. Boyce, Stephen Cullenberg, Prasanta 
Pattanaik and Robert Pollin, eds., Egalitarian Development in the Era of Globalization: 
Essays in Honor of Keith Griffin.  Northampton. MA: Edward Elgar, forthcoming. 
 
Metcalf, Gilbert E. (1999) ‘A Distributional Analysis of Green Tax Reforms,’ National 
Tax Journal 52(4): 655-681. 
 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (1995) Climate 
Change, Economic Instruments and Income Distribution. Paris: OECD. 
 
Parry, Ian W.H. (2004) ‘Are Emissions Permits Regressive?’ Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 47: 364-387. 
 
Poterba, James M. (1989) ‘Lifetime Incidence and the Distributional Burden of Excise 
Taxes,’ American Economic Review 79(2): 325-330. 
 
Puig-Ventosa, Ignasi (2004) ‘Potential Use of Feebate Systems to Foster 
Environmentally Sound Urban Waste Management,’ Waste Management 24: 3-7. 
 
Riskin, Carl, Zhao Renwei and Li Shi (2001), Equality in Retreat. Armonk NY: M.E. 
Sharpe. 
 
Sarmiento, Jorge L. and Nicolas Gruber (2002) ‘Sinks for Anthropogenic Carbon,’ 
Physics Today 55(6): 30-36. 
 
Shah, Anwar and Bjorn Larsen (1992) Carbon Taxes, the Greenhouse Effect, and 
Developing Countries. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 957. 
 
Shepard, Lawrence (1976) ‘The Short-Run Incidence of a Gasoline Tax Rebate Plan,’ 
Journal of Economic Issues 10(1): 169-172. 
 
Sinton, Jonathan E. (2001) ‘Accuracy and Reliability of China’s Energy Statistics,’ China 
Economic Review 12: 373-383. 
 
 21 
Smulders, Sjak and Herman R.J. Vollebergh (2001) ‘Green Taxes and Administrative 
Costs,’ in Carlo Carraro and Gilbert E. Metcalf, eds., Behavioral and Distributional 
Effects of Environmental Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 92-129. 
 
Speck, Stefan (1999) ‘Energy and Carbon Taxes and their Distributional Implications,’ 
Energy Policy 27: 659-667. 
 
State Statistical Bureau (1996) China Statistical Yearbook. Beijing: China Statistical 
Publishing House. 
 
Sterner, Thomas (2003) Policy Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource 
Management. Washington, D.C. Resources for the Future. 
 
Symons, Elizabeth, John Proops, and Philip Gay (1994) ‘Carbon Taxes, Consumer 
Demand and Carbon Dioxide Emissions: A Simulation Analysis for the UK,’ Fiscal 
Studies 15(2): 19-43. 
 
Symons, Elizabeth, Stefan Speck, and John Proops (2000) ‘The Effects of Pollution and 
Energy Taxes across the European Income Distribution,’ Keele University Economics 
Research Paper No. 2000/05. 
 
Tiezzi, Silvia (2005) ‘The Welfare Effects and the Distributive Impact of Carbon 
Taxation on Italian Households,’ Energy Policy 33: 1597-1612. 
 
US Congressional Budget Office (2000) Who Gains and Who Pays Under Carbon-
Allowance Trading? The Distributional Effects of Alternative Policy Designs. 
Washington, DC: CBO, June. 
 
US Congressional Budget Office (2001) An Evaluation of Cap-and-Trade Programs for 
Reducing U.S. Carbon Emissions. Washington, DC: CBO, June. 
 
US Congressional Budget Office (2003) Shifting the Cost Burden of a Carbon Cap-and-
Trade Program. Washington, DC: CBO, July. 
 
US Energy Information Administration (2004) International Energy Annual 2002. 
Available at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/iea/contents.html. 
 
Wang, Xiaohua and Zhenmin Feng (1999) ‘Common Factors and Indicators of Rural 
Household Energy Consumption in China,’ Energy Studies Review 9(2): 96-101. 
 
West, Sarah E. and Robert C. Williams III (2002) ‘Estimates from a Consumer Demand 
System: Implications for the Incidence of Environmental Taxes,’ Cambridge, MA: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 9152. 
 
 22 
Wier, Mette, Katja Birr-Pedersen, Henrik Klinge Jacobsen, and Jacob Klok (2005) ‘Are 
CO2 Taxes Regressive? Evidence from the Danish Experience,’ Ecological Economics 
52: 239-251. 
 
World Bank (1997) Clear Water, Blue Skies: China’s Environment in the New Century. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
 
Younger, Stephen (1996) ‘Estimating Tax Incidence in Ghana using Household Data,’ in 
D.E. Sahn, ed., Economic Reform and the Poor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 231-253. 
 
Younger, Stephen, David Sahn, Steven Haggblade, and Paul Dorosh (1999) ‘Tax 
Incidence in Madagascar: An Analysis Using Household Data,’ World Bank Economic 
Review 13(2): 303-331. 
 
Zhang, Zhongxiang (1998) The Economics of Energy Policy in China: Implications for 
Global Climate Change. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
 
Zhang, Zhongxiang (2000) ‘Decoupling China’s Carbon Emissions Increase from 
Economic Growth: An Economic Analysis and Policy Implications,’ World Development 
28(4): 739-752.  
 
Zhang, Zhongxiang and Andrea Baranzini (2004) ‘What Do We Know about Carbon 
Taxes? An Inquiry into their Impacts on Competitiveness and Distribution of Income,’ 
Energy Policy 32: 507-518.
 23 
 
Figure 1a: Annual Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the Consumption and 
Flaring of Fossil Fuels, China and the United States, 1980-2002 
(metric tons of carbon) 
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Date source: Energy Information Administration, International Energy Annual 2002,   
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/total.html#IntlCarbon. 
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 Figure 1a: Annual Carbon Dioxide Emissions per capita from the Consumption and 
Flaring of Fossil Fuels, China and the United States, 1980-2002 
(metric tons of carbon per capita) 
 
 
Annual Carbon Emissions, China and United States, 1980-2002 
(tons of carbon per capita)
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
US
China
 
  
Data source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Annual 2002,   
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/total.html#IntlCarbon. 
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Table I: Breakdown of Household Expenditures in China, 1995 
         
All households 
Per capita Per capita Share of       Household Transport    
Expenditure expenditure total  Industrial  fuels and and comm-  
Decile (yuan) expenditure Food goods Housing electricity unication Othera 
1 591 2.3% 77.4% 11.2% 1.1% 1.4% 0.9% 8.0% 
2 840 3.3% 76.2% 11.0% 1.3% 1.2% 1.5% 8.7% 
3 1,022 4.0% 76.6% 10.6% 1.6% 1.2% 1.3% 8.6% 
4 1,218 4.8% 74.8% 10.7% 2.5% 1.2% 1.5% 9.5% 
5 1,451 5.7% 73.2% 10.8% 2.6% 1.1% 1.4% 11.0% 
6 1,771 6.9% 70.0% 11.5% 3.3% 1.4% 1.7% 12.0% 
7 2,258 8.8% 63.6% 14.0% 4.5% 1.8% 1.8% 14.2% 
8 3,097 12.1% 55.2% 16.3% 6.2% 2.6% 2.1% 17.5% 
9 4,414 17.3% 48.2% 19.9% 7.0% 2.7% 2.5% 19.7% 
10 8,866 34.7% 38.7% 24.7% 9.0% 2.3% 2.5% 22.8% 
Total 2,553 100.0% 65.4% 14.1% 3.9% 1.7% 1.7% 13.2% 
         
Rural households 
Per capita Per capita Share of       Household Transport    
Expenditure expenditure total  Industrial  fuels and and comm-  
Decile (yuan) expenditure Food goods Housing electricity unication Othera 
1 542 3.5% 77.0% 11.4% 0.9% 1.5% 0.9% 8.2% 
2 756 4.9% 77.4% 11.0% 1.2% 1.3% 1.2% 8.0% 
3 894 5.8% 76.6% 10.6% 1.4% 1.1% 1.5% 8.8% 
4 1,021 6.6% 76.1% 10.8% 1.6% 1.2% 1.4% 8.9% 
5 1,161 7.5% 75.6% 10.6% 2.5% 1.1% 1.5% 8.7% 
6 1,315 8.5% 74.9% 10.5% 2.3% 0.9% 1.4% 9.9% 
7 1,505 9.7% 73.2% 10.5% 2.8% 1.0% 1.6% 11.1% 
8 1,760 11.4% 71.5% 10.9% 3.3% 1.1% 1.9% 11.3% 
9 2,154 13.9% 67.2% 12.0% 4.2% 1.0% 2.3% 13.2% 
10 4,353 28.2% 56.5% 12.7% 9.4% 1.0% 4.7% 15.7% 
Total 1,546 100.0% 72.6% 11.1% 3.0% 1.1% 1.8% 10.4% 
         
Urban households 
Per capita Per capita Share of       Household Transport    
Expenditure expenditure total  Industrial  fuels and and comm-  
Decile (yuan) expenditure Food goods Housing electricity unication Othera 
1 1,657 3.3% 60.2% 16.5% 3.8% 4.0% 0.7% 14.8% 
2 2,437 4.9% 55.9% 18.3% 4.9% 3.7% 0.9% 16.3% 
3 2,973 5.9% 53.6% 19.1% 5.5% 3.4% 1.1% 17.3% 
4 3,438 6.9% 51.4% 18.7% 5.5% 3.5% 1.5% 19.3% 
5 3,907 7.8% 49.5% 20.1% 6.4% 3.2% 1.6% 19.4% 
6 4,468 8.9% 47.4% 21.6% 5.9% 3.0% 1.6% 20.5% 
7 5,151 10.3% 46.1% 21.4% 6.4% 3.0% 1.8% 21.3% 
8 6,046 12.1% 42.0% 22.8% 7.2% 2.7% 2.0% 23.4% 
9 7,506 15.0% 39.9% 24.0% 8.3% 2.5% 1.8% 23.5% 
10 12,530 25.0% 31.4% 31.0% 8.4% 1.9% 2.1% 25.1% 
Total 5,013 100.0% 47.7% 21.4% 6.2% 3.1% 1.5% 20.1% 
Source: Authors' calculations from 1995 CASS survey data. 
a   'Other' includes education, medical expenditures, and miscellaneous expenses. 
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Table II: Carbon Loading Factors, 1995 
     
 Energy GDPb Tons SCE / Tons carbon /  
 (million tons SCEa) (billion yuan) 10,000 yuan 10,000 yuan 
Food 55.1 1199.3 0.46 0.28 
Industrial Goods 961.9 2435.4 3.95 2.37 
Housing 13.4 382.0 0.35 0.21 
Household fuels and electricity 157.5 79.1 19.91 11.95 
Transport and Communication 58.6 323.7 1.81 1.09 
Other 45.2 976.3 0.46 0.28 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data drawn from the 1996 State Statistical Yearbook. 
aSCE = Standard coal equivalent. 
bTotal spending on household fuels and electricity is calculated from household survey data. 
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Table III: Distributional Incidence of a Carbon Charge, 1995 
    
All households 
Per capita Per capita      
Expenditure expenditure Charge per Charge / 
Decile (yuan) capita (yuan) expenditurea 
1 591 12 2.1% 
2 840 17 2.0% 
3 1,022 20 2.0% 
4 1,218 24 1.9% 
5 1,451 28 1.9% 
6 1,771 37 2.1% 
7 2,258 54 2.4% 
8 3,097 87 2.8% 
9 4,414 136 3.1% 
10 8,866 282 3.2% 
    
Rural households 
Per capita Per capita      
Expenditure expenditure Charge per Charge / 
Decile (yuan) capita (yuan) expenditurea 
1 542 11 2.1% 
2 756 15 2.0% 
3 894 17 1.9% 
4 1,021 20 2.0% 
5 1,161 22 1.9% 
6 1,315 24 1.8% 
7 1,505 28 1.9% 
8 1,760 34 2.0% 
9 2,154 43 2.0% 
10 4,353 86 2.1% 
    
Urban households 
Per capita Per capita      
Expenditure expenditure Charge per Charge / 
Decile (yuan) capita (yuan) expenditurea 
1 1,657 55 3.3% 
2 2,437 80 3.3% 
3 2,973 96 3.2% 
4 3,438 112 3.3% 
5 3,907 126 3.2% 
6 4,468 146 3.3% 
7 5,151 168 3.3% 
8 6,046 195 3.2% 
9 7,506 244 3.3% 
10 12,530 440 3.5% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data reported in Table I and II. 
a This column represents the average charge/expenditure ratio for each household in the 
decile.  This differs slightly from the ratio of the decile averages reported in preceding 
columns.  For discussion see note 30 and Appendix I. 
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Table IV: Distributional Incidence of a Chinese Sky Trust 
       
All households 
Per capita Per capita    net benefit    
expenditure expenditure Household per capita % of expenditures 
decile (yuan) size (yuan) charge dividend net benefit  
1 591 5.3 57 2.1% 12.4% 10.3% 
2 840 4.9 52 2.0% 8.2% 6.3% 
3 1,022 4.8 49 2.0% 6.8% 4.8% 
4 1,218 4.8 45 1.9% 5.7% 3.7% 
5 1,451 4.6 41 1.9% 4.8% 2.8% 
6 1,771 4.5 32 2.1% 3.9% 1.8% 
7 2,258 4.1 15 2.4% 3.1% 0.7% 
8 3,097 3.7 -18 2.8% 2.2% -0.6% 
9 4,414 3.4 -67 3.1% 1.6% -1.5% 
10 8,866 3.2 -213 3.2% 0.9% -2.3% 
              
Rural households 
Per capita Per capita    net benefit    
expenditure expenditure Household per capita % of expenditures 
decile (yuan) size (yuan) charge dividend net benefit  
1 542 5.4 58 2.1% 13.4% 11.3% 
2 756 5.0 54 2.0% 9.1% 7.2% 
3 894 4.9 52 1.9% 7.7% 5.8% 
4 1,021 4.8 49 2.0% 6.8% 4.8% 
5 1,161 4.8 47 1.9% 5.9% 4.0% 
6 1,315 4.7 45 1.8% 5.2% 3.4% 
7 1,505 4.7 41 1.9% 4.6% 2.7% 
8 1,760 4.6 34 2.0% 3.9% 2.0% 
9 2,154 4.3 26 2.0% 3.2% 1.2% 
10 4,353 4.1 -17 2.1% 2.0% 0.0% 
              
Urban households 
Per capita Per capita    net benefit    
expenditure expenditure Household per capita % of expenditures 
decile (yuan) size (yuan) charge dividend net benefit  
1 1,657 3.9 14 3.3% 4.5% 1.2% 
2 2,437 3.6 -11 3.3% 2.8% -0.4% 
3 2,973 3.5 -27 3.2% 2.3% -0.9% 
4 3,438 3.4 -43 3.3% 2.0% -1.3% 
5 3,907 3.4 -57 3.2% 1.8% -1.5% 
6 4,468 3.3 -77 3.3% 1.5% -1.7% 
7 5,151 3.2 -99 3.3% 1.3% -1.9% 
8 6,046 3.2 -127 3.2% 1.1% -2.1% 
9 7,506 3.1 -175 3.3% 0.9% -2.3% 
10 12,530 3.0 -371 3.5% 0.6% -2.9% 
Based on a carbon tax of 300 yuan/tC, which yields a dividend of 69 yuan per person. 
Source: Authors' calculations (see text for details). 
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Table V: Distributional Effect on Poverty of a Chinese Sky Trust, 1995 
    
  All Households Rural Households Urban Households 
    
Headcount Poverty Rate: Before 14.67 19.11 3.84 
Headcount Poverty Rate: After 11.65 14.88 3.75 
Difference 3.03 4.23 0.08 
    
Poverty Gap: Before 3.06 3.99 0.78 
Poverty Gap: After 2.20 2.81 0.72 
Difference 0.85 1.18 0.06 
    
Squared Poverty Gap: Before 1.02 1.34 0.26 
Squared Poverty Gap: After 0.67 0.85 0.23 
Difference 0.35 0.48 0.03 
        
Source: Authors' calculations from 1995 CASS survey data. 
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Appendix I: Average of Ratios vs. Ratio of Averages 
         
All households 
Per capita Per capita    net benefit  with average of ratios   with ratio of averages 
expenditure expenditure Charge per per capita Charge / Net benefit /   Charge / Net benefit /  
Decile (yuan) capita (yuan) (yuan) expenditure expenditure   expenditure expenditure 
1 591 12 57 2.1% 10.3%  2.0% 9.6% 
2 840 17 52 2.0% 6.3%  2.0% 6.2% 
3 1,022 20 49 2.0% 4.8%  2.0% 4.8% 
4 1,218 24 45 1.9% 3.7%  1.9% 3.7% 
5 1,451 28 41 1.9% 2.8%  1.9% 2.8% 
6 1,771 37 32 2.1% 1.8%  2.1% 1.8% 
7 2,258 54 15 2.4% 0.7%  2.4% 0.7% 
8 3,097 87 -18 2.8% -0.6%  2.8% -0.6% 
9 4,414 136 -67 3.1% -1.5%  3.1% -1.5% 
10 8,866 282 -213 3.2% -2.3%   3.2% -2.4% 
          
Rural households 
Per capita Per capita    net benefit  with average of ratios   with ratio of averages 
expenditure expenditure Charge per per capita Charge / Net benefit /   Charge / Net benefit /  
Decile (yuan) capita (yuan) (yuan) expenditure expenditure   expenditure expenditure 
1 542 11 58 2.1% 11.3%  2.1% 10.7% 
2 756 15 54 2.0% 7.2%  2.0% 7.1% 
3 894 17 52 1.9% 5.8%  1.9% 5.8% 
4 1,021 20 49 2.0% 4.8%  2.0% 4.8% 
5 1,161 22 47 1.9% 4.0%  1.9% 4.0% 
6 1,315 24 45 1.8% 3.4%  1.8% 3.4% 
7 1,505 28 41 1.9% 2.7%  1.9% 2.7% 
8 1,760 34 34 2.0% 2.0%  2.0% 2.0% 
9 2,154 43 26 2.0% 1.2%  2.0% 1.2% 
10 4,353 86 -17 2.1% 0.0%   2.0% -0.4% 
          
Urban households 
Per capita Per capita    net benefit  with average of ratios   with ratio of averages 
expenditure expenditure Charge per per capita Charge / Net benefit /   Charge / Net benefit /  
Decile (yuan) capita (yuan) (yuan) expenditure expenditure   expenditure expenditure 
1 1,657 55 14 3.3% 1.2%  3.3% 0.9% 
2 2,437 80 -11 3.3% -0.4%  3.3% -0.4% 
3 2,973 96 -27 3.2% -0.9%  3.2% -0.9% 
4 3,438 112 -43 3.3% -1.3%  3.3% -1.3% 
5 3,907 126 -57 3.2% -1.5%  3.2% -1.5% 
6 4,468 146 -77 3.3% -1.7%  3.3% -1.7% 
7 5,151 168 -99 3.3% -1.9%  3.3% -1.9% 
8 6,046 195 -127 3.2% -2.1%  3.2% -2.1% 
9 7,506 244 -175 3.3% -2.3%  3.3% -2.3% 
10 12,530 440 -371 3.5% -2.9%   3.5% -3.0% 
Source: Authors’ calculations from 1995 CASS survey data. 
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Appendix II: Distributional Incidence of Carbon Charge and Sky Trust on Income Basis 
        
All households 
Per capita Per capita Per capita  Charge per         
income income expenditure Capita Charge / Charge /  Net benefit /  Net benefit /  
decile (yuan) (yuan) (yuan) expenditure income expenditure income 
1 645 1,037 17 1.8% 3.0% 6.8% 8.6% 
2 1,008 1,115 20 1.9% 2.0% 5.5% 4.9% 
3 1,297 1,240 23 1.9% 1.8% 4.8% 3.6% 
4 1,610 1,393 28 2.0% 1.7% 4.1% 2.6% 
5 1,989 1,502 32 2.1% 1.6% 3.5% 1.9% 
6 2,492 2,033 46 2.4% 1.8% 2.6% 0.9% 
7 3,156 2,500 69 2.6% 2.2% 1.2% 0.0% 
8 4,109 3,422 101 2.9% 2.5% -0.2% -0.8% 
9 5,555 4,466 138 3.0% 2.5% -0.8% -1.2% 
10 11,168 6,820 221 3.0% 2.2% -1.4% -1.5% 
                
Rural households 
Per capita Per capita Per capita  Charge per         
income income expenditure capita Charge / Charge /  Net benefit /  Net benefit / 
decile (yuan) (yuan) (yuan) expenditure income expenditure income 
1 577 1,035 17 1.8% 3.4% 6.9% 9.6% 
2 878 1,058 18 1.8% 2.1% 6.1% 5.8% 
3 1,092 1,143 21 1.9% 1.9% 5.3% 4.4% 
4 1,301 1,190 22 1.9% 1.7% 5.0% 3.6% 
5 1,527 1,376 25 1.9% 1.6% 4.3% 2.9% 
6 1,791 1,358 27 2.0% 1.5% 4.2% 2.4% 
7 2,122 1,514 30 2.0% 1.4% 3.5% 1.9% 
8 2,584 1,975 39 2.1% 1.5% 3.5% 1.2% 
9 3,456 2,008 40 2.1% 1.2% 2.5% 0.9% 
10 7,831 2,804 63 2.2% 0.9% 1.2% 0.1% 
        
Urban households 
Per capita Per capita Per capita  Charge per         
income income expenditure capita Charge / Charge /  Net benefit /  Net benefit /  
decile (yuan) (yuan) (yuan) expenditure income expenditure income 
1 1,891 2,137 67 3.2% 3.6% 0.7% 0.3% 
2 2,790 2,780 94 3.3% 3.4% -0.6% -0.9% 
3 3,327 3,328 109 3.2% 3.3% -1.0% -1.2% 
4 3,817 3,906 128 3.3% 3.3% -1.2% -1.5% 
5 4,338 4,270 134 3.2% 3.1% -1.4% -1.5% 
6 4,925 4,724 158 3.3% 3.2% -1.7% -1.8% 
7 5,599 5,293 172 3.3% 3.1% -1.8% -1.8% 
8 6,551 6,053 204 3.3% 3.1% -2.0% -2.1% 
9 8,237 7,290 251 3.4% 3.1% -2.3% -2.2% 
10 15,657 10,340 347 3.3% 2.5% -2.5% -2.0% 
Source: Authors' calculations from 1995 CASS survey data.    
 
 
